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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW-1957
SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE
The only cases reported for Ohio under this heading during the past
year concerned the unemployment insurance program. One of the most
interesting of these involved the interpretation of Section 4141.29 (C)(8)
of the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Law, which contains the dis-
qualification relating -to attendance at an educational institution. In
Acierno vi. General Fireproofing Co.,1 the Ohio Supreme Court 'held that
a part time student attending Youngstown College was not disqualified
from receiving unemployment benefits because of such attendance.
The employee in question had been working at night. He had reg-
istered and actually started attending classes :before he was laid off by his
employer. The courses he was taking involved three hours of instruction
on Monday, Wednesday and Friday mornings, with an additional hour
on Wednesday, and for this he was to receive 9 semester 'hours of college
credit. His layoff occurred shortly after his courses began, and his claim
for benefits was first allowed but subsequently disallowed by the ad-
ministrator. The disallowance was -upheld by the referee, -the board of
review, and the common pleas court. The court of appeals, however,
reversed and ruled that benefits should have been allowed. The Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, upholding the right
to 'benefits.
Under the disqualification in question, no individual may receive
benefits for the duration of any period of unemployment -where 'he has
left -his most recent work for the purpose of attending an established
educational institution, "or is a student regularly attending an established
educational institution during the school term." According to the ma-
jority opinion the court felt that the state legislature hardly could have
intended to penalize an unemployed person who sought an education as
a secondary, part-time activity. The case at hand was carefully distin-
guished from that of a full time student, -the court pointing out that the
nine semester hours credit was far short of the sixteen hours of credit
carried -by the normal full time student. Three -lower court cases2 were
distinguished at least partly on .the basis that the claimant in each in-
stance had enrolled after the -layoff; and also, apparently, on the ground
that in one case the student was carrying a full time schedule, and in
another, 'he was taking thirteen semester hours, which was close 'to a full
" 166 Ohio St. 538, 144 N.E. 2d 201 (1957).
'Cornell v. Schroeder, 94 Ohio App. 75, 114 N.E.2d 595 (1952); Rafferty v.
Bureau of Unemployment Coamp., 6 CCH, UNMfP. INS. R P. 5 8267 (Ohio);
Connell v. Bureau of Unemployment Comp., 6 CCH, UNEMP. INs. REP. 5 8333
(Ohio).
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time schedule. No question of availability was involved in the instant
case.
Judge Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion insisting that the worker
should have been disqualified since he was regularly attending classes at
stated times. This position was anticipated by the majority opinion where-
,in Judge Herbert pointed out that even one hour a week at a night
school would operate to disqualify a student under -this interpretation.8
To -this writer, also, it seems unlikely that the legislature would have
intended to completely discourage continuing education for working
people by forcing them to drop their courses of study immediately upon
being laid off, on pain of losing their unemployment benefits. Such a
-policy would run head-on into the national policy embodied in the G.I.
Bill, under which the claimant in question was receiving his tuition.
The majority held that the phrase "regularly attending" referred to
normal attendance at the particular educational institution for a student
who contemplated completion of the studies necessary for graduation
under the customary and usual schedule, i.e., a regular full-time student.
The phrase chosen -by the legislature is not as clear as the dissent pro-
fesses, and -the suggestion that the majority view amounts to judicial
legislation does not appear .to be well founded.
Another important decision involves the seasonal classification of race-
tracks. In Racetracks of Ohio v. Bureau,4 -it was held that -the operation
of racetracks in Ohio is a seasonal business within the meaning of Sec.
4141.33 of the Ohio law. According to the court, the seasonal nature
of this sport is common knowledge.
The provision in question defines as seasonal any employment in an
occupation or industry which, because of the climatic conditions or be-
cause of the seasonal nature thereof, is customarily operated only during
regularly recurring periods of less than 36 weeks in the year. The ad-
vantage of having the seasonal character determined, of course, is that
benefits then become payable to the workers engaged therein, in the
event of unemployment, only during the longest seasonal period which
the best practices of the particular industry will permit. Any unemploy-
ment occurring outside of this seasonal period is neither compensable
under the law, once determination has been made, nor chargeable to the
particular employer engaged therein.
The court pointed out that under a separate statute, the race tracks in
s The minority view would probably even disqualify an individual who might choose
to attend one of the adult education courses now being offered by many of the high
schools in Ohio. The high school undoubtedly is an established educational institu-
tion, and under such a program is conducting a regular course of study for a limited
period of five, ten, or fifteen weeks.
'143 N.E.2d 144 (Ohio App. 1956).
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Ohio may meet only after April 1 each year and must dose not later
than October 31, and there may not be more than 44 running days during
the season. Some tracks, according to the evidence, have kept small work-
ing forces from 9 to 11 months during the calendar year,5 -but this, the
court held, should not prevent a finding that this sport is as seasonal as
baseball. The tracks, therefore, have been placed in the same category as
the Cleveland and Cincinnati baseball dubs, as well as 'the Great Lakes
shipping industry.
In Kendall v. Administrator,6 the failure of a claimant to make his
base period employer a party appelee, on appeal to the common pleas
court, and to mail such employer a copy of the notice of appeal within
30 days after receiving the decision of the -board of review,7 was held to
be jurisdictional, and the common pleas court, therefore, had no juris-
diction in the matter even though the employer was made a party on its
own motion and filed an answer challenging the court's jurisdiction.
In Tichenor v. Board of Review,s -the daimant quit his job with an
employer who was subject to the Ohio Unemployment Compensation
Law in order to secure a better job with a railroad, which was subject to
the federal Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act. Thereafter, the
claimant was laid off by the railroad and filed a claim for benefits under
the Ohio law, since 'he had not worked a sufficient amount of time for
the railroad to qualify for federal benefits. The court held that no charge
could be made against the original Ohio employer's account, under these
circumstances, and that no benefits were payable under the Ohio law.
Under Section 4141.29 (C) (1) of the Ohio Revised Code, a worker
is disqualified if he has "quit his work without just cause." There is a
special exception where 'the worker quits to enter the Armed Forces, but
the court ruled that quitting to take a better job does not constitute "just
cause" within the meaning of this disqualification.
The daimant -had contended that the saving dause in Section 4141.30
(E) applied, and that -benefits should have 'been paid. Under the terms
of this Section, a disqualification for quitting without just cause results
in 'the exclusion of base period wages paid 'by the employer involved, in
determining the total benefits payable under Section 4141.30 (D), with
the result that no benefits may thereafter be paid on the basis of any
such wages. However, there is a proviso that this exclusion shall not
5The lower court had relied on this fact in holding that the business was not seasonal.
See Racetracks of Ohio v. Bureau, 137 N.E.2d 211 (C.P. 1956) and the report of
this case in the 1956 Survey, 8 WEST. RES. L REV. 362 (1957).
0145 N.E.2d 415 (Ohio App. 1957).
As expressly required by the last paragraph of Oio REv. CODE § 4141.28.
8141 N.E.2d 180 (Ohio App. 1957).
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apply where the worker quits to accept full time employment pursuant
to an actual bona fide offer from another employer and thereafter re-
ceives wages equal to 10 times his weekly benefit amount. The court
noted that the definition of "employment" -in Section 4141.01(B) (j)
specifically excludes service penformed after June 30, 1939, with respect
to which benefits are payable under the Railroad Unemployment Insur-
ance Act. It was therefore held that the proviso had no application in
this case, even though the claimant had earned wages from the railroad
exceeding 10 times his weekly benefit amount.
Literally speaking, this is undoubtedly the correct application of the
statute. 'Whether the legislature actually intended to use the word "em-
ployment" in its defined sense in the proviso in question, may be open
to some doubt, but the safe course is the one which the court followed.
It is conceivable that the permanent cancellation of these wage credits
actually was intended to apply unless the worker changed to a job in
which additional wage credits under the Ohio law might be earned. In
the charging of benefits for experience rating purposes, the employers
during the worker's base period are reached in inverse chronological
order, i.e., the most recent employer is charged first."
Apart from the special question of cancellation of wage credits, the
court also has precedent for holding that leaving one job to accept an-
other which offers better pay amounts to quitting without "just cause,"
and such action normally has been held to result in disqualification.1" The
courts have generally considered moves of this type to be at the worker's
own risk.
In Cornell v. Board of Review," it was held that where the employee
was laid off and a benefit year established, on the basis of which bene-
fits were paid until the employee was rehired shortly thereafter by the
same employer, and the employee quit without just cause a week after
such rehiring, no benefits were payable for -the balance of the benefit
year previously established.
EDWIN R. TEPLE
90MO REv. CODE S 4141.24. In this connection, however, the court's opinion
seems to place undue emphasis upon the charging of benefits to the employer's ac-
count. The provisions for the payment of benefits and those governing charging for
experience rating purposes are not necessarily the same, and where benefit rights are
involved, only the former govern.
1 0See, Teple, Disqualification: Discharge for Misconduct and Voluntary Quit, 10
Omio ST. L.J. 191, 202-203 (1949).
31139 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio App. 1955).
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